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Abstract
In this thesis, we provide evidence on the performance of an unethical invest-
ment strategy during the 21st-century. We examine publicly traded US companies
engage in one of these five industries; gambling, oil/gas, alcohol, tobacco, and de-
fense. Using a sample of approximately 200 unethical stocks from 2001-2016, we
hypothesize that the unethical portfolio does not outperform the market and SRI
comparables and that there is a clear trend before and after the global financial
crisis in 2008. Consistent with the first hypothesis and contrary to previous re-
search, we could not prove that the unethical portfolio generated any excess return
over the market. Meanwhile, there is a clear trend before and after the financial
crisis, whereas the unethical portfolio overperforms prior and underperforms the
market and comparables post, due to the inclusion of oil/gas industry.
Keywords: Abnormal Returns, Ethical, Sin Stock, SRI, Unethical, Unethical
Investment.
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Chapter1
Introduction
Whats prelude the first chapter is a background of investment responsibility and a
problem definition followed by the definitions of unethical- and ethical investments.
After that the purpose of comparing unethical and ethical investment strategies
from 2001-2016 is clarified and lastly, a study outline presented.
1.1 Background and Problem Definition
”There is one and only one social responsibility of business to use its resources
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within
the rules of the game”.
(Friedman, 1970)
Ever since the Nobel-winning professor, Milton Friedman, expressed his strong
position on the fiduciary duty of businesses in 1970, it has been debated among
academics, for example, DesJardins & McCall (1990) and Buono & Nichols (1990).
In addition to fiduciary duty, there is also a citizen’s responsibility to act in the best
interest of the society. Friedman’s article sparked questions if businesses have a
responsibility beyond generating the best risk-adjusted return for its shareholders,
and consequently, the role of the investors. Those who oppose Friedman’s theory
and advocate for social responsibility argue that business has a wider set of duties
to more than just the shareholders (Garriga, & Mel, 2004). The debate extends to
the paradigm of economic rationalism and theoretical models used by investors.
2Theoretical models pioneered by prominent academics, like Friedman, try to ex-
plain the different spectrum’s of reality with scientific accuracy. To be applied, the
economic models are based on mathematical predictions and assumptions, hence
seen as both static and rigid (Woolley, 2010). Two common assumptions the fi-
nancial theories are often based on is rational behavior and perfect capital markets
(Markowitz, 1991). Nevertheless, while modern financial theories progressed, so
did the ethical awareness among investors and the consequence of their invest-
ments. Thereupon a movement of ethical investing emerged, also called Socially
Responsible Investing (SRI), which has grown in popularity during the 21st-century
(Figure 1.1) and created friction between SRI and investment theory.
Figure 1.1. Capital Invested in SRI Capital Markets in U.S (US SIF Foundation)
The friction becomes apparent when examining the Nobel-winning work of
the US economist Harry Markowitz (Peylo, 2012). He presented a commonly
used tactic for investors to optimize their portfolios by diversification, which is
strictly based on risk and returns according to modern portfolio theory (Markowitz,
1952). However, SRI takes another aspect in consideration, the ethical aspect
beyond what affects the valuation. By screening to exclude the unethical companies
engaging in immoral businesses, and finding those who support Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), it narrows the investment spectrum of high-yielding stocks.
Thus, complicate the optimal risk-return relationship and creating a clear problem
with modern portfolio theory and an ethical investing approach. It also calls
the assumption of rational agents into question, which solely acts in their self-
3interest. More importantly, making ”sin-averse” investors miss out on potential
profits and diversification opportunities. Today’s typical ”sin-averse” investors
that prefer companies with strong CSR policy are institutional investors due to
their exposition to public pressures (Salabler, 2007). Given the large amount of
public capital the institutional investors manage, their investment strategy has
large implications on both the public’s (shareholder’s) optimal return and the
financial sector. Some examples are banks, insurance companies, pension funds,
and religious organizations (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009).
In this thesis, we explore the problem that arises between fiduciary duty and
the citizen’s responsibility in the world of finance from an investor’s perspective.
1.2 Unethical Definition
What is perceived as unethical depends on the period examined. Today, there are a
handful of industries that are considered unethical by numerous social groups and
individuals around the world due to their addictive properties, and undesirable
environmental and social consequences. Unethical stocks, also described by the
term ”sin stocks”, are those firms in industries that traditionally engaged in the
business of alcohol, defense, tobacco, gambling and pornography (Statman 2000,
p. 31; Carlsson Reich et al. 2001, p. 14). However, most of the companies engaged
in the pornographic industry are not publicly traded and are therefore excluded
in this paper due to the lack of available data. In addition to these traditionally
unethical industries, we added the oil/gas industry. Leaving us with these five
unethical industries; alcohol, defense, tobacco, gambling, and oil/gas.
The inclusion of oil/gas industry as unethical is due to the imminent threat
of global warming and other environmental harm it imposes (UNFCCC, 2017).
There are many other industries and different greenhouse gasses that contribute to
global warming and therefore could be included, for example, the meat industry.
However, these industries may be hard to justify as strictly unethical, and in some
cases, there is a blurred line of what constitutes as an ethical or unethical activity.
Therefore to not end up splitting hairs in this complex discussion, we chose to only
extend our research to the oil/gas industry in this regard.
41.3 Ethical Definition
The term ”ethical investments” is widely defined as the integration of social consid-
erations, personal values, and economic factor when making an investment decision
(Michelson & Wailes & Van Der Laan & Frost, 2004). Common practice for SRI is
the avoidance of companies that sell or produce fossil fuel, armament and addictive
substances, e.g. alcohol, gambling, fast food, and tobacco, while seeking out those
companies engaged in environmental sustainability, human rights, and diversity
(Logue, 2009).
Depending on the country of domicile and religion, different expressions for
ethical investments tend to be preferred. Thus, what constitutes as ethical is highly
subjective leading to that SRI indexes and funds defines their ethical guidelines
differently.
Today we have an abundance of acronyms for the ethical approach to investing -
socially responsible investing (SRI), economically targeted investing (ETI), ethical
investing (EI), impact investing (II), environmental, social and governance (ESG).
All these acronyms state the same concept of ethical investing and can also be seen
as synonyms (Gray, 2012). Thus, to keep the coherence, we will hereinafter use
one acronym for the ethical investing approach, and refer to it as SRI.
1.4 Unethical Investment Decisions
Imagine that you have the option to either invest in two different companies,
one yields a low return and the other a high return, at the same risk exposure.
According to the rational behavior assumption, everyone would invest in the com-
pany yielding the highest return. Now imagine that this high-yielding company
is conducting unethical business and investing in businesses like alcohol, tobacco
and pornography production whereas the low-yielding company conducts SRI and
supports the environment. According to the assumption of rational agents in eco-
nomic theories, the obvious choice would be the high-yielding unethical company.
As Friedman expressed (1970), ”in finance, it is all about the profits generated by
the business that is of interest for most investors.”
The SRI performance has, during the 21st-century, been studied extensively.
5Hamilton et al. (1993), Statman (2000), Schro¨der (2004, 2007), Kreander et al.
(2005), Bello (2005), all show that SRI neither out- or underperform conventional
investing. Despite this, the capital invested in SRI-oriented capital markets has
more than doubled since 2007 (Figure 1.1). If the theory of rational agents holds,
the increased SRI would be financially motivated due to an increased return of
ethical stocks. If no such indication exists, and the unethical stocks outperform
the SRI strategy, it shows that the utility maximum is affected by more factors
than profit maximization.
To determine if there is a possible disadvantage for sin-averse investors, caused
by a narrowed investment spectrum, we investigate the profitability of the ex-
cluded unethical stocks. Previous research (discussed in chapter 3) on the subject
have proved that unethical stocks have outperformed the market, up until 2007
(Table 2.1).
The question remains if there is a superiority of an unethical investments strat-
egy, and moreover if it remains beyond the time frame of previous research.
1.5 Objective
The objective of the paper is to answer the question if an unethical investment
strategy is a superior strategy in the 21st-century, compared to the market and SRI
regarding the risk-adjusted return. At the same time, we do not want to discredit
the SRI movement, rather examine if the increased influx of SRI is financially
driven from an investor’s perspective.
The continued incline of social and environmental awareness is crucial due to
the environmental threat and harm some industries imposes and how this SRI
growth will affect the financial markets for unethical stocks is yet unclear for the
21st-century. According to Hong’s & Kacperczyk’s (2009) neglection theory, the
increase of SRI will render a higher abnormal return for unethical stocks.
By looking at the performance of an unethical investment strategy before and
after a specific point in time, we hope to clarify a contrast and trend between the
two-time periods due to the heightened awareness of SRI (Figure 1.1). The period
examined in this study includes the global financial crises 2008 which was the
worst recession in 80 years (The Economist, 2013). Making it an abnormality of
6what constitutes a normal fiscal year. Therefore we will also examine the financial
performance and risk prior and post the global financial crises. To exclude the full
extent of the financial crises, we will exclude the years 2007-2009.
If the unethical stocks do not outperform the market nor SRI, there are no ad-
vantages of an unethical investment strategy and no loss for ”sin-averse” investors
in neglecting them.
However, if it turns out that the unethical stocks do outperform the market
and SRI, it will challenge the notion of purely rational agents. The motivation for
SRI has to be greater since the rational choice will be to do otherwise, making the
investment decision depending more heavily on individual preferences. Investors,
reluctant to miss out on the opportunity and only interested in maximizing their re-
turn, will invest in these businesses nevertheless. It will also highlight the fact that
the SRI has gained much traction among investors despite having a lower return
on investment than an unethical investment strategy and consequently neglecting
profitable stocks.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this paper continues as follows: Chapter 2, presents the hypothe-
ses for this study and in chapter 3, previous literature and its impact are brought
up together with the theoretical foundation of this research. The next chapter,
chapter 4, portrays the data set and methodology and chapter 5 describes the
result, which later is discussed in chapter 6. At last, the conclusion is drawn in
chapter 7.
Chapter2
Previous Research
In chapter two, a description of the previous studies regarding unethical stock per-
formance and their implication is presented.
2.1 Previous Research
Merton (1987) published a study where he provided two possible reasons why
unethical stocks often are undervalued. First, he showed that the assumptions of
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) no longer holds, thus leading to that
not only systematic risk matters for pricing. Therefore, an increased litigation risk
should raise the expected return. Second, that institutional investor and other
prominent investors choose to neglect unethical stocks, which will depress their
value compared to the fundamental value due to limited risk sharing. Unethical
investments are, according to most studies, a superior investment strategy when it
comes to expected returns within the industries of gambling, tobacco, and alcohol
(Waxler, 2004).
Heinkel et al. (2001) researched the possibility of how norm-constrained in-
vestors can influence the market. They exhibit this with the development of a
theoretical model. If enough constrained investors exist, the lack of risk-sharing
opportunities will generate a higher cost of equity capital for polluting firms and
the opposite for non-polluting companies.
This was further studied and developed by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) which
classified unethical stocks as ”publicly traded companies involved in the business
8of alcohol, tobacco, and gambling.” They released maybe one of the most influ-
ential research papers in this field of discussion and presented that the investors
neglect unethical stocks because of social norms, litigation risk, and regulatory
scrutiny, consequently, leading to a higher expected and risk-adjusted return for
unethical stocks. During the period 1926 to 2006, they found that portfolios with
equal-weighted long unethical stocks and short comparable stocks resulted in a sig-
nificant average abnormal return of 3.5% per year in the US stock market. Hong
and Kacperczyk (2009) also hypothesized that there is a force within the societal
norm against funding unethical companies. In line with their hypothesis, they
see that unethical stocks are less covered by analysts and less included in norm-
constrained investors portfolios. Thus, explaining the abnormal risk-adjusted re-
turn and supported theories created by Merton in 1987. Hong’s and Kacperczyk’s
(2009) research became a springboard for further discussion and analyses about
SRI and unethical stocks.
During the same period, a couple of other studies were posted, for example,
Statman and Glushkov (2009); Perez Liston and Soydemir (2010) and Salaber
(2009) all investigated the impact of constructing a portfolio containing unethical
stocks, but all with a different approach and focus. According to all these studies,
the result was similar. The tobacco industry tended to outperform the expected
return of the market; however, the uncertainty remains for the other sectors. Stat-
man and Glushkov (2009) used CAPM framework and received that the unethical
stocks outperformed the market by 3.3% per year. Perez Liston and Soydemir
(2010) used conventional factor models, and acknowledge that the Sharpe ratio,
reward-to-risk measure, was higher for the unethical stocks. Salaber (2009) con-
structed the study with mixed logit models during a recession in Europe and saw
that unethical stock, on average, outperformed the SRI stocks with 1.4% per year.
92.1.1 Implications of Previous Research
When evaluating the previous stream of studies, it becomes clear that unethical
stocks have managed to generate positive abnormal returns in most cases (Ta-
ble 2.1). Some studies found no significant alphas, like Lobe and Walkshusl (2011),
but otherwise, the alphas vary from a high 13.7% (Fabozzi et al., 2008) to low a
2.62% annually (Statman and Glushkov, 2009). The different results depend on
the investment strategy, unethical industry definition and performance measures.
Findings by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and Salaber (2007) showed that other
factors than those included in the multi-factor models affect the unethical stocks,
confirmed by studying the R-squared of the regressions. Their results also suggest
that the market is not fully efficient. However, something yet to research is the
compared performance of SRI and unethical stocks in modern time with the same
constraints as in this paper. To clarify, we constructed a table of the previous
results presented in this section.
Table 2.1. Previous Results
Author Region Sample Size Observed Period Weighting CAPM (%) 3-Factor (%) 4-Factor (%)
Salaber (2007) EU 158 1926-2005 Value 0.33* 0.30 -
Fabozzi et al. (2008) 21 Countries 267 1970-2007 Equal 0.96* - -
Salaber (2009) US 183 1991-2007 Equal - - 0.30***
Statman& Glushkov (2009) US 198 1991-2007 Equal 0.278** 0.218* 0.189
Hong & Kacperczyk (2009) US 193 1926-2006 Equal 0.30** 0.28** 0.31**
Liston& Soydemir(2010) US NA 2001-2007 Equal 0.082*** 0.071*** 0.07***
Lobe & Walkshusl (2011) 51 Countries 755 1995-2007 Value 0.18 - 0.13
Chapter3
Hypotheses and Theoretical
Foundation
In the third chapter, the two hypotheses are set accordingly. The first hypothesis
is for the whole examined period and the second is divided into two sub-periods.
Included in chapter three is also a description of the efficient market hypothesis and
portfolio theory, which are the main theoretical framework applied in this study.
In line with our objective, we construct a portfolio of unethical stocks to com-
pare with the SRI strategy and the US market. The SRI strategy is represented
by an SRI Fund, Parnassus Core Equity Fund, and an SRI index, Vanguard FTSE
Social Index US. The period of this research is from 2001-2016. Two hypotheses
have been constructed below to test our objective.
3.1 Hypothesis I
Based on the results from previous studies we set the hypothesis that our unethical
portfolio yields a higher risk-adjusted total return than the market (S&P 500),
Vanguard FTSE Social Index US and Parnassus Core Equity Fund. To make a
legitimate comparison to the market, we will also include S&P 500 equal weight
index (S&P 500 EWI) in addition to the standard market capitalization weighted
index. If the unethical portfolio performs better than the market, it will render a
positive and significant abnormal return, represented by alpha, according to the
11
factor models discussed in chapter 4.
H0, a: Unethical portfolio does not outperform the market index, Vanguard
FTSE Social Index US and Parnassus Core Equity Fund regarding return and risk
for years 2001-2016.
HA, a: Unethical portfolio does outperform the market index, Vanguard FTSE
Social Index US and Parnassus Core Equity Fund concerning return and risk for
years 2001-2016.
3.2 Hypothesis II
The second hypothesis we want to examine is the trend of the unethical portfolio.
Specifically, if the unethical portfolio yields a persistent average abnormal return
through time; by studying the periods prior and post to the global financial crisis
2008. If the performance is persistent over time, the abnormal return of the first
period should be similar to the abnormal return in the second period. If not,
is there a negative or a positive trend? The same performance measurement as
in hypothesis I will be conducted for the two periods 2001-2006 and 2010-2016.
According to previous studies, the heightened SRI will lead to an even higher
abnormal return on unethical stocks.
H0, b: The unethical portfolio yields the same abnormal return post-crisis, i.e.,
period 2010-2016, as before the global financial crisis, i.e., 2001-2006.
HA, b: The unethical portfolio yields a lower or higher abnormal return post
to the global financial crisis than prior.
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3.3 Theoretical Framework
3.3.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis
If the stock market is efficient, the stock price should reflect and incorporate
all available information and respond immediately when new information arises
(Fama, 1970). The implication of the efficient market hypothesis is that all stocks
are already traded at their fair value and therefore there are no over- or under-
valued stocks. There are three degrees of the Efficient Market Hypothesis: Weak
form, Semi-strong form and Strong form (Table 3.1)
Weak form: Stock prices already reflect all information that can be derived
by examining market trading data, such as, short interest, trading volume, and
history of past prices, etc. which means that a technical analysis of past trading
information is pointless.
Semi-strong form: All publicly available information, regarding the prospects of
a firm, is already reflected in the stock prices. For example, fundamental analysis,
quality of management, earnings forecast, and dividends, etc. Indicating that
technical and fundamental analysis are pointless and that one needs to act on
insider information to obtain an abnormal return.
Strong form: Stock prices reflect all information relevant to the firm, includ-
ing insider information which indicates that technical, fundamental analysis and
insider trading are pointless.
Table 3.1. Market Efficiency (authors interpretation of Fama, 1970)
Type of Efficiency Assumption Implications for
Abnormal Returns
Weak Market Efficiency Current price reflects all historical data Possible
Semi-strong Market Efficiency Current price reflects all historical data Possible
and publicly available information
Strong Market Efficiency Current prices reflects all information Not Possible
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3.3.2 Portfolio Theory
It has now been over sixty years since the publication of Harry Markowitzs ground-
breaking hypothesis about portfolio selection (Markowitz, 1952). Its vast impact is
best represented by the fact that it is now referred to as Modern Portfolio Theory
(MPT). Markowitz provided a framework for portfolio theory as a mathematical
problem regarding economic agents who act under uncertainty. His theory focuses
on how optimizing investors would behave, which are assumed to be risk-averse
and how to maximize the expected return of an asset-portfolio for a given level
of risk (standard deviation). Furthermore, it underlines the importance of diver-
sification and that an individual assets risk and return should be evaluated by
its contribution to the whole portfolio and not by itself. The implication of the
risk-averse assumption is that investors will always prefer a portfolio containing
less risk over a riskier one given the same expected return.
This leads us to the efficient frontier; if all possible combinations of assets are
plotted in a graph with expected return on the vertical axis and risk (standard
deviation) on the horizontal axis, there would be an upper edge of the plotted
asset combinations called the efficient frontier. Portfolios on the efficient frontier
represent the maximum return for a given risk level; i.e. most effective, thus the
combination of assets all investors would choose from.
Figure 3.1. Efficient Frontier (Finance Train)
Chapter4
Methodology and Data
Whats preludes the fourth chapter is which performance measurement to be used,
followed by a thorough description of how we constructed the unethical portfolio and
how the data was collected. Thereafter, a summary of the comparables, a discussion
about the portfolios weighting scheme and the phenomena called survivorship bias
are presented.
4.1 Methodology
The unethical portfolio was compared with Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund US,
Parnassus Core Equity Fund, representing the SRI strategy and different proxies
for the market (S&P 500, S&P 500 EWI, CRSP database). All total returns
calculations includes dividends reinvested.
To test our hypotheses, we measured the financial performance of the unethical
portfolio and the comparables using mainly OLS-regression analysis and Sharpe
ratio. The ratio is a widely used statistical measurement of risk-adjusted return
based on the average return in excess of the risk-free rate and standard deviation
(Sharpe, 1966). The linear factor models used in this paper try to divide the return
of assets into explainable and unexplained parts. Though the actual relationship
may be different, it gives a statistical guess of the reality. The p-value determine
the statistical significance of the estimates.
15
4.1.1 Linear Factor Models
4.1.1.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model- CAPM
The CAPM is building on the earlier work of Harry Markowitz (Markowitz, 1952)
on diversification and modern portfolio theory. It was introduced by William F.
Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965) and Jan Mossin (1966) independently, and is
widely used in finance to determine the required rate of return of assets. Intuitively
in the CAPM, investors want compensation for the time-value of money i.e. the
risk-free rate and non-diversifiable risk i.e. systematic risk. A US Treasury bill and
a proxy index of the market is often used to estimate the risk-free rate and market
return. The market beta reflects the sensitivity of the assets returns to the market
return in excess of the risk-free rate, thus its exposure to systematic risk. The alpha
is the excess return, also called abnormal return, i.e. the return over/under the
required rate of return. Both the alpha and beta are estimated using the ordinary
least squared (OLS) regression model where alpha is the intercept and beta are the
coefficients. Though the CAPM could not sufficiently withstand empirical testing,
it is still commonly used due to its simplicity and intuitive power; it provides a
benchmark rate of return for evaluating investments.
ri,t − rf,t = αi + βi,MKT ×MKTi + i,t
where,
ri,t − rf,t = The monthly total return of a portfolio, i, at time t, in excess of
the risk-free rate at time t (one-month US Treasury bill).
MKTi = The monthly total return of the market portfolio at time t, in excess
of the risk-free rate at time t.
i,t = An error term with zero mean that represents the variation not explained
by the variables in the regression model.
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4.1.1.2 Fama-French Three-Factor Model
By using multifactor models and allowing for several systemic factors, it can pro-
vide a better description of security returns because the systematic risk is not
always due to one source. Eugene Fama and Kenneth French found that value
and small-cap stocks outperformed their counterpart growth stocks and large-cap
stocks; thus, they developed their multifactor model. The Fama-French three-
factor model is an extension of the CAPM by adding value and size factors in the
regression (Fama & French, 1993). The value factor is represented by high minus
low (HML), which is the difference in returns between high book-to-market stock
portfolios and low book-to-market stock portfolios. The size factor represented
by small-minus-big (SMB) is the difference in returns between a portfolio of large
stocks and a portfolio of small stocks.
ri,t − rf,t = αi + βi,MKT ×MKTi + βi,SMB × SMBt + βi,HML ×HMLt + i,t
where,
SMBt = The monthly total return difference, at time t, between a portfolio of
the 10 per cent smallest US stocks and a portfolio of the 90 per cent largest US
stocks.
HMLt = The monthly total return difference, at time t, between a portfolio
of the 30 per cent highest US book-to market ratio stocks and a portfolio of the
30 per cent lowest US book-to-market ratio stocks.
4.1.1.3 Carhart Four-Factor Model
The Carhart four-factor model is a further extension of the Fama-French three-
factor model by including a monthly momentum factor (MOM). It captures the
tendency of stocks to continue to rise if it has already gone up and vice versa. This
factor is included in our study due to investors tend to use momentum strategies;
buy winners and sell losers from the previous period, thus giving it a momentum
effect. The MOM factor is the difference between the equal weighted average
of the highest and the lowest performing companies, lagged one month (Carhart,
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1997). Similar to the Fama-French three-factor model, the momentum factor is also
defined as a self-financing portfolio but is long previous 12-month return winners
and short previous 12-month loser stocks.
ri,t − rf,t = αi + βi,MKT ×MKTi + βi,SMB × SMBt + βi,HML ×HMLt+
βi,MOM ×MOMt + i,t
where,
MOMt = The total return difference between a portfolio of 12-month return
winner stocks and a portfolio of 12-month return loser stock, at time t-1.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Construction Of The Unethical Portfolio
All data for the unethical portfolio were screened and retrieved through the Bloom-
berg Terminal. The selection process is initiated to exclude non-useful and erro-
neous or missing data from the database. The goal is to include a large part of
the US stock market while concurrently reassuring that all stocks fulfill the fol-
lowing criteria. All the companies we include in the screening process are from
the US and traded on the US stock market, and engaged in the unethical activity
of either gambling, defense, alcohol, tobacco, and oil/gas. We chose the industry
classification benchmark (ICB) code corresponding to the five industries to screen
our sample of unethical companies (ICB, 2012).
The oil/gas industry in our sample is oil/gas producers (ICB code 0530) and oil
equipment services and distributors (ICB code 0570). These two sectors include
four different sub-sectors: exploration and production (ICB code 0533), Integrated
oil and gas (ICB code 0537), oil equipment and services (ICB code 0573) and
pipelines (ICB code 0577).
The alcohol industry is divided in into two parts, brewers (ICB code 3533)
and distillers/vintners (ICB code 3535). The sub-sector brewers include in its
definition manufacturers and shippers of cider or malt products such as beer and
ale. Furthermore, distillers and vintners include producers, distillers, vintners,
blenders, and shippers of wine and spirits such as whiskey, brandy, rum, gin or
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liqueurs.
Gambling (ICB code 5752) contains companies that provide gambling and
casino facilities. It includes online casinos, racetracks, and manufacturers of pach-
inko machines and casino and lottery equipment.
Tobacco (ICB code 3780) Manufacturers and distributors of cigarettes, cigars
and other tobacco products, includes tobacco plantations.
Defense (ICB code 2717) Producers of components and equipment for the de-
fense industry, including military aircraft, radar equipment, and weapons.
The portfolio allocation is equal weighted and rebalanced monthly for 16 years.
The dynamic variables we choose to include in our screening procedure are the
price-to-book ratio, monthly total return, and market capitalization.
The period of our research range from 01/01/2001 to 31/12/2016 with a month-
ly total return of our equally weighted unethical portfolio. After screening for active
trading status, relevant sectors (ICB) and exchanges in the US we end up with 599
unethical-stocks. Furthermore, the unethical portfolio will only include companies
with a higher market capitalization than 50 million USD, because when including
all companies, the only two companies below 50 million market cap experienced
enormous return above 1000% for an individual month. Hence, making them
extreme outliers in our sample. After screening for the market capitalization and
other data availability criteria in Bloomberg Terminal, the final number in our
portfolio 01/01/2001 is 225 unethical-stocks and the end count in the portfolio
31/12/2016 is 187 unethical stocks. The differences in the number of sin stocks
in the portfolio are due to monthly rebalances. Furthermore, a few individual
unethical stocks monthly returns are missing in our portfolio and are therefore
omitted in the calculations.
4.2.2 Kenneth R. French Data Library
The co-founder of the Fama-French three-factor model, Kenneth R. French has a
data library for all the factors in the different factor models. Monthly data for the
factors; MKT (excess market return), SMB, HML, and MOM was retrieved from
US research return data from French’s data library. The factors are constructed
by using six value-weighted portfolios formed on size and book-to-market. The
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SMB-factor (small minus big) is an average return on the three small portfolios
minus the three big portfolios which can be shown as:
SMB = 1
3
(Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth) - 1
3
(Big value + Big
Neutral + Big Growth).
The next factor is the HML-factor (high minus low) which displays the average
return on the two value portfolios minus the average return of the two growth
portfolios. Calculated as follows:
HML = 1
2
(Small Value + Big Value) - 1
2
(Small Growth + Big Growth).
MKT is the market’s excess return, or value-weight return of all the companies
in the US from the center for research in security prices (CRSP) databases and
listed on either one of NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. They should also have a CRSP
share code of 10 or 11, right price and share data for month t, and real return data
for month t minus the monthly Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates. The
momentum factor is calculated by subtracting the average return of two high prior
return with the mean of the two low prior return portfolios:
MOM = 1
2
(Small High + Big high) - 1
2
(Small low + Big Low).
It is constructed with six value-weight portfolios formed on size, and prior (2-
12) returns are used. The monthly formed portfolios are the intersections of two
portfolios formed on market equity with the monthly market equity breakpoint,
at the median NYSE market equity, and three portfolios formed on prior (2-12)
returns with breakpoints at the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles.
The portfolios used to construct the momentum factor each month include
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks with prior return data. Stocks must have
a price for the end of month t-13 and a good return for t-2 to be included in
the portfolio for several months t which are formed at the end of the month t-1.
Furthermore, each stock must have market equity for t-1.
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4.2.3 Comparables
As previously mentioned, we compare our unethical portfolio to both indexes and
funds to get a comprehensive picture of the performances. These will be S&P 500
index (S&P 500), S&P 500 equal weighted index (S&P 500 EWI), Vanguard FTSE
Social Index Fund US, and Parnassus Core Equity Fund. We chose to compare
with two different SRI comparables, where one is a passively managed index fund
and the other actively managed fund, to get a more coherent comparison of the
SRI strategy.
One of the SRI comparables is Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund US, which is
a market capitalization weighted index. This fund eliminates companies involved
in; nuclear power, not diversified workplaces, alcohol, gambling, and pornogra-
phy. Also, those companies that violate any of the human rights or have an ad-
verse impact on the environment are rejected. Top three holdings in Vanguard
FTSE are Microsoft, Apple, and Alphabet and in total the portfolio consists of
405 large-capitalization stocks. The fund charges a management fee of 0.19% per
year (Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund, 2016).
The Parnassus Core Equity Fund tries to build a diversified portfolio by in-
vesting in equity securities of mainly large market-cap companies that meets the
requirement for the SRI parachute. What they do differently from many other
large-blend funds is that they put much effort in research, and hold a very con-
centrated portfolio of approximately fifty stocks. By doing so, they ensure that all
the stocks fulfill all the SRI criteria. The total assets under management are just
over 11.2 billion USD (Shareholders report: Parnassus Funds, 2017).
The last comparables are two different types of the S&P 500 index. First is the
S&P 500 founded in 1957. It consists of over 500 of the biggest companies that
have common stocks listed in the US, on New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ.
The top three biggest holdings are Exxon Mobil, Apple, and Microsoft. The S&P
index is the most commonly followed index in the world and with the purpose of
being representative of the whole US stock market (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2017).
The second market index is the S&P 500 equal weighted index (S&P 500 EWI)
which is included to ensure that we do not get an overestimated result of our
equally weighted unethical portfolio. The allocation to each stock is 0.2 % of the
index total (Invesco, 2017).
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4.2.4 Equally Weighted Portfolios
An equally weighted portfolio is a portfolio with every stock given the same weight
regardless of the company’s size. In contrast, a market capitalization weighted
portfolio will give companies weight according to their market capitalization con-
tribution to the portfolio. Hence, companies with large market-cap will also have
a high weight. The different approaches to portfolio weights will result in various
characteristics. Small-cap stocks are usually more volatile than large-cap stocks
(Fama & French, 1993). Therefore, an equally weighted portfolio can lead to a
higher risk, because of the greater weight towards small-cap stocks than a market-
cap weighted portfolio.
The largest companies in our unethical portfolio are dominated by companies
in the oil/gas industry because of the high entry barrier and oligarchic nature of
the industry. Therefore, despite the higher risk exposure, we chose to construct the
unethical portfolio with equal weight to get more diversification in all the unethical
industries we are interested in. Even with the adjustment for this diversification
problem, a large part of the portfolio consists of oil/gas companies.
To comprehensively make a comparison to the market index, we included both
the normal S&P 500 and the newer S&P 500 EWI. However, considering the widely
use of the ”normal” S&P 500 index in finance, we chose to focus on S&P 500 as
the regression benchmark in this research.
Vanguard FTSE Social Index US is also market-cap weighted and have to be
considered when analyzing the results. Regarding the comparison between the
unethical portfolio and Parnassus, the weights for Parnassus are chosen freely
by the fund manager, with no standardized weighting of the stocks. It is not
an entirely fair comparison, but rather a testimony to the fund manager’s skill
compared to our equally weighted unethical portfolio.
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4.2.5 Survivorship Bias
A survivorship bias is caused by excluding companies from a backtest because they
do not operate anymore today or no longer actively traded on the exchanges (Elton,
Gruber, & Blake 1996). Often resulting in an overestimation of past performances
of a portfolio, because companies that are not successful enough and manage to
survive the whole period are excluded. To mitigate this problem, we rebalanced
the unethical portfolio monthly, as mentioned before, to account for new companies
entering and exiting the portfolio according to the criteria we set up. The same
thing is done with the other comparables, where changes of the membership in the
indexes/fund are accounted for on a monthly basis.
Chapter5
Empirical Results
In chapter 5 our results from the performance tests of the unethical portfolio and
comparables will be divided according to the different hypotheses. In the last section,
the results robustness is evaluated and tested. All the alphas are reported, describing
the monthly abnormal return for the examined period, which is expressed in percent.
Furthermore, summarized statistic tables with Sharpe ratios will be provided.
5.1 Hypothesis I Overall Performance
Figure 5.1. Total Return 2001-2016
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5.1.1 Risk
The unethical portfolio outperforms all other comparables regarding total return
from 2001-2016 (Figure 5.1), but it comes with a higher exposure to risk, as shown
in the summarized statistics (Table 5.2). The unethical portfolio has the highest
standard deviation (7,82%) among the comparables, meanwhile, Parnassus Core
Equity Fund have the lowest standard deviation (3,64%). Another measurement
of risk is the market beta, which measures the systematic risk in comparison to
the overall market. As displayed in Table 5.1, the market beta for the unethical
portfolio in the four-factor model is 1,058, hence more exposed to systematic risk
and more volatile than the broader market. Similarly, Vanguard Social Index US is
also more volatile than the broader market with a market beta above 1, but slightly
lower than for the unethical portfolio with a value of 1,052. Furthermore, the graph
(Figure 5.1) and the high R-squared (0,973) shows that Vanguard Social Index US
closely follows the S&P 500 Index, indicating a very similar stock composition
between the two indexes. The reason may be that companies included in S&P
500 must be selected by the committee which assesses the company. Therefore,
making the S&P 500 index include very few stocks which Vanguard Social Index US
considers unethical. The comparable least exposed to systematic risk is Parnassus
Core Equity Fund with a market beta of 0,777.
5.1.2 Risk-adjusted Performance
Parnassus Core Equity Fund have the highest Sharpe ratio of all the comparables,
which means that the fund generates the most return in excess of the risk-free rate
per unit of risk, measured by standard deviation. The equally weighted unethical
portfolio and S&P 500 EWI have very similar Sharpe ratio of 0,110 and 0,112
respectively, and are only surpassed by Parnassus Core Equity Fund with Sharpe
ratio of 0,182. Hence, putting our unethical portfolio right in the middle among
the comparables and Vanguard Social Index US lowest according to their Sharpe
Ratio (Table 5.2).
When analyzing the alphas of the factor models in table 5.1, we observe that
the unethical portfolio yields an excess return over required rate of return with very
large p-values. Thus, we cannot conclude that the alpha estimate is significantly
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different from zero, which indicates that the unethical portfolio neither under-
or outperform the overall market. The unethical portfolio is exposed to the size
factor, SMB, and the value factor, HML, with values of approximately 0,72 and
0,5 irrespective of the factor model, indicating that our unethical portfolio exhibits
large exposure to stocks with low market capitalization and value stocks. Moreover,
the momentum factor is statistically insignificant.
Vanguard Social Index US has a statistically significant negative alpha at a
10% significance level. The index yields too low return corresponding to the risk it
incurs and underperforms the overall market by approximately 0,12% on a monthly
basis. Vanguard’s size factor, SMB, is negative and statistically significant in
the four-factor model, indicating that the index contains predominantly large-cap
stocks. Furthermore, the negative momentum factor tells us that the winners of the
period (month), on average, is not the winners of the previous period. Comparably,
Parnassus Core Equity Fund yields a statistically significant positive alpha at a
1% significance level, which correspondingly means that it yields an abnormal
return over the assumed risk and overperforms the overall market monthly by
approximately 0,3%. All the other factors in the multifactor models are statistically
insignificant.
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Table 5.1. OLS-Regression
2001-2016 α βMKT βSMB βHML βmom R
2 Obs
Unethical Portfolio
CAPM 0,272 1,243*** 0,485 192
(0,514) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor -0,028 1,088*** 0,724*** 0,497*** 0,566 192
(0,943) (0,000) (0,000) (0,009)
Carhart 4 factor -0,010 1,058*** 0,723*** 0,496*** -0,053 0,567 192
(0,981) (0,000) (0,000) (0,009) (0,646)
Vanguard Social Index
CAPM -0,161** 1,087*** 0,966 192
(0,015) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor -0,147** 1,099*** -0,062** 0,010 0,967 192
(0,030) (0,000) (0,025) (0,767)
Carhart 4 factor -0,119* 1,052*** -0,064** 0,008 -0,081*** 0,973 192
(0,062) (0,000) (0,011) (0,766) (0,000)
Parnassus CE-Fund
CAPM 0,297*** 0,777*** 0,873 192
(0,002) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,302*** 0,783*** -0,040 0,022 0,874 192
(0,002) (0,000) (0,404) (0,701)
Carhart 4 factor 0,298*** 0,790*** -0,040 0,022 0,011 0,874 192
(0,003) (0,000) (0,408) (0,699) (0,709)
The results are calculated using a robust OLS-regression with monthly total return of the
portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (one month US Treasury bill) as the dependent
variable and the factors according to CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model and
Carhart four-factor model as the independent variable from 2001 to 2016. The total
return includes dividends reinvested. The values in parentheses are the p-value of the
coefficients. All coefficients in the regression is rounded to three decimal numbers. ***
1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance.
Table 5.2. Summary Statistic 2001-2016
Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max Sharpe Ratio
Unethical Portfolio 192 0,972 7,820 -26,791 28,399 0,110
Vanguard Social Index 192 0,465 4,829 -19,290 13,840 0,070
Parnassus CE-Fund 192 0,777 3,635 -15,410 12,240 0,182
S&P 500 EWI 192 0,670 4,953 -21,144 18,565 0,112
S&P 500 192 0,532 4,252 -16,793 10,919 0,098
Mean 192 0,683 5,098 -19,886 16,793 0,115
Median 192 0,670 4,829 -19,290 13,840 0,110
The summarized statistics are calculated from the monthly total return of the different
portfolios. The Sharpe ratios are calculated using the monthly total return of the portfolio
in excess of the risk-free rate (one-month US Treasury bill). All values are rounded to
three decimal numbers.
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5.2 Hypothesis II - Prior And Post The Finan-
cial Crises
There is a large contrast prior and post the global financial crises. Before the
financial crises, the unethical portfolio has the highest Sharpe ratio among the
comparables and highest positive alpha (though only significant for the CAPM)
and a market beta below 1. After the financial crises, we see an almost complete
reversal of the results, with the unethical portfolio having the lowest Sharpe ratio,
a negative alpha and an increased systematic risk to a market beta above 1.
As presented in figures 5.2 and 5.3 below, the unethical portfolio generally
seems to outperform both market and the two SRI index/fund on a risk-adjusted
basis before the global financial crises. After, it underperforms the comparables
(the coefficients of the regressions are interpreted as the section above for the
whole period). The post-financial crises period is characterized by the unethical
portfolios sudden drop in monthly total return, and all other comparables closely
following S&P 500.
Figure 5.2. Total Return 2001-2006
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Table 5.3. Summary Statistic 2001-2006
Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max Sharpe Ratio
Unethical Portfolio 72 1,859 5,991 -14,099 14,881 0,274
Vanguard Social Index 72 0,215 4,593 -11,830 11,440 0,001
Parnassus CE-Fund 72 0,682 3,140 -9,160 12,240 0,150
S&P 500 EWI 72 1,335 4,670 -11,584 9,118 0,240
S&P 500 72 0,321 4,002 -10,858 8,793 0,027
Mean 72 0,882 4,479 -11,506 11,294 0,139
Median 72 0,682 4,593 -11,584 11,440 0,150
The summarized statistics are calculated from the monthly total return of the different
portfolios. The Sharpe ratios are calculated using the monthly total return of the portfolio
in excess of the risk-free rate (one month US Treasury bill). All values are rounded to
three decimal numbers.
Figure 5.3. Total Return 2010-2016
Table 5.4. Summary Statistic 2010-2016
Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max Sharpe Ratio
Unethical Portfolio 84 0,496 7,519 -16,315 16,918 0,065
Vanguard Social Index 84 1,102 3,850 -7,590 10,950 0,285
Parnassus CE-Fund 84 0,988 3,334 -7,660 8,760 0,295
S&P 500 EWI 84 3,563 12,186 -24,310 32,872 0,292
S&P 500 84 1,075 3,655 -7,977 10,919 0,293
Mean 84 1,445 6,109 -12,770 16,084 0,246
Median 84 1,075 3,850 -7,977 10,950 0,292
The summarized statistics are calculated from the monthly total return of the
different portfolios. The Sharpe ratios are calculated using the monthly total return
of the portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (one month US Treasury bill). All
values are rounded to three decimal numbers.
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Table 5.5. OLS-Regression Before and After the Financial Crisis
2001-2006 α βMKT βSMB βHML βmom R
2 Obs
Unethical Portfolio
CAPM 1,487** 0,812 0,311 72
(0,014) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,533 0,807*** 0,759*** 0,549** 0,470 72
(0,347) (0,000) (0,002) (0,032)
Carhart 4 factor 0,608 0,975*** 0,739*** 0,372 0,234** 0,494 72
(0,282) (0,000) (0,003) (0,169) (0,029)
Vanguard Social Index
CAPM -0,212** 1,095*** 0,966 72
(0,036) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor -0,016 1,076*** -0,107*** -0,151*** 0,976 72
(0,873) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000)
Carhart 4 factor -0,026 1,052*** -0,104*** -0,126*** -0,033 0,977 72
(0,795) (0,000) (0,002) (0,003) (0,122)
Parnassus CE-Fund
CAPM 0,338* 0,672*** 0.780 72
(0,053) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,407* 0,665*** -0,040 -0,052 0.783 72
(0,077) (0,000) (0,637) (0,665)
Carhart 4 factor 0,397* 0,643*** -0,037 -0,028 -0,032 0.784 72
(0,098) (0,000) (0,678) (0,845) (0,610)
2010-2016
Unethical Portfolio
CAPM -1,078* 1,438*** 0,529 84
(0,071) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor -0,934* 1,182*** 0,676** 0,879*** 0,633 84
(0,091) (0,000) (0,017) (0,001)
Carhart 4 factor -0,710 1,130*** 0,741*** 0,616** -0,580*** 0,683 84
(0,186) (0,000) (0,005) (0,012) (0,002)
Vanguard Social Index
CAPM 0,006 0,999*** 0,976 84
(0,929) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor -0,005 1,018*** -0,068** -0,015 0,977 84
(0.943) (0,000) (0,031) (0,575)
Carhart 4 factor 0,001 1,017*** -0,066** -0,022 -0,016 0,978 84
(0,989) (0,000) (0,038) (0,449) (0,515)
Parnassus CE-Fund
CAPM 0,071 0,837*** 0,912 84
(0,530) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,046 0,875*** -0,148** -0,015 0,920 84
(0,666) (0,000) (0,017) (0,732)
Carhart 4 factor 0,023* 0,880*** -0,154 0,012 0,060 0,923 84
(0,098) (0,000) (0,678) (0,845) (0,610)
The results are calculated using a robust OLS-regression with monthly total return of
the portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (one month US Treasury bill) as the depen-
dent variable and the factors according to CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model and
Carhart four-factor model as the independent variable. The total return includes div-
idends reinvested. The values in parentheses are the p-value of the coefficients. All
coefficients in the regression is rounded to three decimal numbers. *** 1%, ** 5% and *
10% significance.
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5.3 Robustness of Results
To determine the accuracy of the regression analysis a couple of diagnostic tests
have been used. We started with the Durbin-Watson test, which is widely used
in time series data and will generate a number that always lies between 0 and
4. The test indicates if there is any autocorrelation in the residuals. A number
close to 2 indicates that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals, while there is
positive autocorrelation if the number is closer to 0 and negative autocorrelation
if it is closer to 4 (Durbin & Watson, 1951). One thing to keep in mind is that the
Durbin-Watson test is biased for models with the autoregressive moving average
which leads to an underestimation of the autocorrelation. For an unbiased statistic
for large samples, we computed the Durbin h-statistic. By doing a Durbin-Watson
test, we find that our data does not contain any autocorrelation. Thus, there is no
need to adjust for when doing the regression analysis. We received a test-statistic
of 1.977693.
By doing a Breusch-Pagan (BP) test we checked for heteroscedasticity, this is
one of the most commonly used tests for checking if the data has a heteroscedastic
error term. It works by allowing the heteroscedasticity to be a function of the
independent variables and assumes that it is a linear function of those variables
(Breusch & Pagan, 1979). By running the Breush-Pagan test in Stata, we received
the chi-squared test result with a p-value of 0.0024 and therefor reject the null hy-
potheses of homoscedasticity, at a 10% & 5% & 1%-level of alpha. Consequently,
we use robust in the regressions. Applying these heteroskedasticity-consistent stan-
dard errors does not change the main results of the paper. However, a downside
of the (BP) test is that it considers the heteroscedasticity to be a linear function
of the independent variables. So, if one fail to find clear evidence of heteroscedas-
ticity with the BP test it may not rule out a nonlinear relationship between the
independent variables and the variance in the error term.
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Finally, we controlled the assumption of normality in the error terms distri-
bution with the Jarque-Bera test. The test did reject the null, meaning that the
error term has not a normally distributed error term. Even though this normality
of error terms assumption, is an explicit assumption behind a model, it is also
typically the least important one (Bera & Jarque, 1981). Therefore, we do not
make any alterations to account for it.
Table 5.6. Robustness Check
Unethical Portfolio Vanguars Social Index Parnasuss CE-Fund
Rejected Not Rejected Rejected Not Rejected Rejected Not Rejected
Jarque-Bera test X X X
H0:Normally distributed
error term
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test X X X
H0 Homoscedasticity
in residuals
Durbin’s alternative test X X X
H0 Autocorrelation
in residuals
Chapter6
Discussion
The results shown in the previous chapter will here be analyzed and the reasons
behind discussed. Particular attention will be brought to the definition of unethical
stocks and the impact of including the oil/gas industry. Furthermore, a comparison
with earlier findings and a discussion around the underlying theories will also be
included.
6.1 Hypothesis I - Overall Performance
Through the evaluation process, we have tested the applicability of CAPM, Fama-
French, and Carhart’s factor models to determine if a selection of unethical stocks
outperformed the SRI comparables and the market. By examining all factor mod-
els, we can find if the systematic risk and abnormal return in CAPM are attributed
to other risk factors.
As expected, the unethical portfolio and S&P 500 EWI experience more volatil-
ity than the other comparables due to the equal weight of the stocks, reflecting the
higher weight given to small-cap stocks, which generally are riskier than mid-cap or
large-cap stocks. The results of the other factors in the regressions show that the
unethical portfolio loads positively on the market factor (MKT), size factor (SMB)
and value factor (HML) at a statistical significance level of 1%. Indicating that
the portfolio is exposed to the risk represented in respective risk-factor. Overall,
the unethical portfolio is largely exposed to systematic risk, skewed pronouncedly
towards small-cap and value stocks. Consequently, the outperformance of the un-
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ethical portfolio shown in the total return graph (Figure 5.1) is attributed to the
higher required rate of return of the portfolio.
Meanwhile, Vanguard Social Index US has a similar exposure to systematic
risk and loads negatively on the size factor (SMB) and momentum factor (MOM).
For the Parnassus Core Equity Fund, the relevant factor model to consider is the
CAPM due to the statistical insignificance of the other risk factors. The actively
managed SRI fund has the lowest exposure to systematic risk and a positive alpha.
In this research, it seems that the fund manager of Parnassus Core Equity Fund
overcame the hurdle of statistical significance, thus showing evidence of skill when
executing a SRI approach. Another thing to take notice of is the high predictability
of the linear factor models for the return streams of Parnassus Core Equity Fund
and Vanguard Social Index US, which means that almost all of the returns can be
explained by the variables.
As previously mentioned, there should be no opportunity to obtain an abnormal
return in a fully efficient market. Consequently, the alpha in every performance
test should be indistinguishable from zero. The assumption of an efficient market
holds true for the unethical stocks during the entire examined period with an
insignificant alpha for all factor models, thus indistinguishable from zero. The
same cannot be said about the other comparables in the regressions. Vanguard
Social Index US experienced a negative monthly alpha of -0,119% with a p-value
of 6,2%, thus underperforms the regression-based market benchmark according to
the four-factor model. Comparably, Parnassus Core Equity Fund experienced a
positive monthly alpha of 0,298% with a p-value of 0,3%. These findings suggest
that the stock market for SRI is not entirely efficient and that it is possible to
earn an abnormal return. The results of the OLS-regressions correspond with the
Sharpe ratio results. The unethical portfolio has almost the same Sharpe ratio
as the market while Vanguard Social Index US has a lower and Parnassus Core
Equity Fund higher.
According to Kim and Venkatachalam (2011), the investors chose to neglect
unethical stocks, despite them having both higher financial reporting quality and
superior risk-adjusted returns, to match the norms of the society. Contrary to
their assertion, our results show that Parnassus Core Equity Fund managed to
outperform the market benchmark by 0,298% during the past 16 years, whereas
34
the unethical portfolio did not. Thus, suggesting that investors, could neglect
unethical stocks in their portfolios and still not miss out on any abnormal return.
Moreover, Salaber (2009, p.12) showed that unethical stocks tend to outperform
the market during a recession. The intuition behind this is that, even in economic
pain, people still buy unethical company’s products and services, due to their
addictive properties. For example, tobacco, alcohol, gambling companies still have
a group of core consumers. Thus, performing better during recessionary periods.
Contrary to Salaber (2009, p.12), our results suggest otherwise. The high market
beta of the unethical portfolio indicates a high market sensitivity and the total
return falls with approximately 93.7% from the beginning of the crisis in April
2008 until it bottomed out in February 2009. Meanwhile, the S&P EWI, S&P 500,
Parnassus Core Equity Fund and Vanguard Social Index US falls with 56%, 50%,
35,8% and 55,3% respectively.
6.2 Hypothesis II - Before and After the Finan-
cial Crises
As discussed previously, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) presented evidence that po-
tentially shunning US unethical stocks would lead to a noticeable effect on the
expected return. Thus, more SRI will result in even higher abnormal returns than
before. However, Angel and Rivoli (1997) argue that for Hong’s and Kacperczyk’s
(2009) theory of neglection to be viable, the neglection has to be substantial and
that there was more explanatory variables affecting the abnormal return. It was
then supported by Salaber’s (2009) research in the European market with reli-
gion, taxation and litigation risk affecting the abnormal return in addition to the
neglection effect.
In our study, we look at this phenomena by examining the different time periods
prior and post the global financial crisis. If we dig deeper into the different periods
(2001-2006 and 2010-2016), we experienced mixed results. The results presented
in this study suggests that the unethical portfolio outperforms the market and
SRI-comparables during the six years before the global crisis, both when it comes
to Sharpe ratio and alpha in the CAPM. However, when observing the multifactor
35
models, the Alpha is still positive, but becomes insignificant and attributed to
other risk factors. For the post-financial crisis period, the abnormal return is
negative and statistically significant for the CAPM and three-factor model, making
it worst among the comparables. By looking at the graphs and regression tables
corresponding to each period (Figure 5.2 & 5.3), the expected abnormal return
decreased in the second period while SRI increased (Figure 1.1). Indicating the
opposite of the evidence Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) presented and more in line
with those of Angel and Rivoli (1997), and Salaber (2009). One reason for this
is that our approach includes the oil/gas and defense industry, making the return
more sensitive to political policy changes and the economic cycles. It cannot be
ignored, that the US changed governing political party from republican to democrat
between the two time-periods, while SRI gained in popularity (Whitehouse, 2017).
Making political policies like taxation, litigation risk in addition to oil-related
factors the main suspects to the cause of decreasing alpha in the unethical portfolio
for the post-crisis period.
6.3 General Discussion
Comparing our results with Salaber (2009), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), and
other previous studies, we find the results from our sample to be substantially
different from what has been concluded by them. The contradictory results are
probably due to the differences in definitions of unethical industries, period, port-
folio constructions and approach. To make our research more comprehensive, we
also conducted a regression with S&P 500 EWI as the benchmark index, as stated
before (Appendix A, tables A.1 A.2). The regression shows very similar results
as the one conducted with the market-cap weighted benchmark, but with lower
statistical significance.
In this study, we the included oil/gas industry which also is the main difference
between our study and the already existing literature on the performance of uneth-
ical stocks in the US. The inclusion of oil/gas companies, which are very sensitive
to the economic cycle of the overall market, tend to impact the performance of
the unethical portfolio substantially, making it more volatile over time. Hence, the
poorly performance during the latest recession.
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The numerous oil/gas companies included makes the performance of the uneth-
ical portfolio strongly affected by oil prices. The correlation between the portfolio
and the price of crude oil is 0.58 (Appendix, figure B.2). None of the other com-
parables are nearly as correlated to the crude oil price. It explains the sudden
decline in returns, during the post-crisis period, for the unethical portfolio which
happened simultaneously as the drop in oil prices 2014 (The Economist, 2014).
Like other commodities, the oil price is partly determined by supply, demand and
market sentiment. The energy demand is strongly affected by economic activity
and the supply by actions of major producers and geopolitical risk. There were
many factors that caused the drop in oil prices in 2014 (The Economist, 2014).
The economic activity was low and technological advances made some demand
shift to alternative energy sources. Additionally, through technological advances
companies discovered new, more efficient ways to produce, for example, fracking,
which then made the US the largest oil producer in the world (Zimpleman, 2015).
Though they are not exporting, their imports have decreased substantially, creat-
ing a vacuum in the demand and an oversupply. Furthermore, the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with Saudi Arabia in focus, did not
want to lose market share to restore the price. Thereby OPEC failed to agree
on withholding some of the supply and instead continued with their usual quan-
tity of production (The Economist, 2014). These factors, in combination with a
strong dollar, was the cause of the drop in prices in 2014, hence, also, the unethical
portfolio.
To test the unethical portfolio’s sensitivity to oil/gas, we recreated the results
of the unethical portfolio in the absence of those companies which are presented
in the appendix (Table B.2). When doing so, the results are in line with those of
previous studies, with the unethical portfolio clearly outperforming the market and
the comparables throughout all periods. Specifically, with an alpha of 0.492%**
for the entire period, 0,757%* for 2001-2006, and 1,485%*** for 2010-2016. The
contradictory results prove the fact that the under-performance of the unethical
portfolio after the financial crisis is solely due to the oil/gas industry. The post-
crisis period could be influenced by a potential ”catching up” effect, which in that
case is more prevalent for all indexes than the unethical portfolio according to
the graph (Appendix B, Figure B.3). Despite that, the unethical portfolio, with
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oil/gas excluded, still performed better than the comparables between 2010-2016.
It supports the view of advocates for unethical investments, that alcohol, tobacco,
gambling, and defense industries are profitable for investors. The rationale is
that these unethical industries have high entry barriers, many large multinational
companies, and a steady demand of their high-margin products/services regardless
of economic conditions (Dimson, Marsh, Staunton, Holland, Matthews, & Rath,
2015). Furthermore, the results confirm that the findings of Salaber (2009, p.12)
hold true even in the US market.
Additionally, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) used Fama’s and French’s (1997)
own industry classification of stocks based on their SIC codes. Meanwhile, we
used the ICB classification system which can make a difference when screening.
Furthermore, the regressions they conducted of their unethical portfolio return
was in excess of a comparable portfolio’s return as the independent variable. The
comparable portfolio consisted of stocks that belonged to Fama-French (1997) in-
dustry groups 2(food), 3(soda), 7(fun) and 43(meals and hotel), which was the
comparables to the unethical industries alcohol, tobacco and gambling. Instead of
pairing the unethical industries with comparable sectors, we chose to compare our
unethical portfolio returns separately against one SRI fund and index. Therefore,
the approach we conducted is to research the effectiveness of a passively managed
SRI screening (Vanguard Social Index) and actively managed SRI screening (Par-
nassus Core Equity Fund) compared to our unethical portfolio, rather than the
neglection effects on unethical stocks as Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) did. Thus
it incorporates the far-reaching effects of SRI.
Through the prior conclusion that the market is not fully efficient due to the
existence of abnormal returns, the attention is directed towards the semi-strong
market efficiency. Here abnormal returns are only possible by the use of insider in-
formation. Yet, we obtained abnormal returns solely through the screening process
conducted with public information (Appendix B, Table B.2). Hence, supported by
previous literature and our results, we can draw the conclusion that the abnormal
returns must be generated by something else and the market is not semi-strong
efficient. Consequently, if we do not have a strong or semi-strong efficiency market,
we must be in the spectrum for a weak efficient market.
In this paper, we examine historical data for different time periods. However,
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the truth of the matter is that past performances do not predict future perfor-
mances. Even if we found statistically significant alpha, it may not persist over
time. In an ever changing economic environment, it is challenging to anticipate
the future even with an abundance of historical data.
There is an argument to be made that hypothesis II needs more historical data
to prove the performance of our comparables. The nature of statistics makes it
hard to obtain any significance if there are not a plethora of data. However, since
the global financial crises happened fairly recently, there are a limited number
of observations for the post-crises period. Furthermore, SRI funds and indexes
had not made a breakthrough until the 21st-century making the data availability
limited for the prior-crises period in Bloomberg Terminal. The problem is evi-
dent when looking at the alpha of the regressions for hypothesis II (Table 5.5).
Even though some estimates may not be statistically significant, it can give some
indication of the skewness of the estimates.
Chapter7
Conclusion
In this last chapter, we will conclude if unethical investment strategy is a superior
strategy and answer our research questions by summarizing the results. Following
is our thoughts on how to further examine the performance of unethical stock.
Previous academic literature shows that unethical stocks are recession-resistant,
profitable business fields, and cash-flow stable. Furthermore, due to societal norms,
public investors, as mutual funds, pension funds, and other institutions chose to
neglect these unethical companies at an excessive rate. In this thesis, we set out
to investigate if an unethical investment strategy in the US is a superior strategy
in the 21st-century and consequently if there is an disadvantage for SRI to neglect
unethical stocks. Furthermore, if the increased SRI has impacted the unethical
stock performance.
What separates our study from previous work is that we included a differ-
ent, broader, definition of unethical industries. Therefore, presenting a different
combination of unethical stocks that before have not been of main interest. By
also including the periods beyond those of previous studies, we provide updated
empirical evidence of unethical stock performance in the US.
Though it had seemed like a financial mistake to neglect unethical stocks in
previous years, our study presents evidence that suggests it to be a close call
between the unethical portfolio, the market, and other SRI comparables. The
mixed results, with Vanguard Social Index US having the lowest risk-adjusted
return and Parnassus Core Equity Fund having the highest throughout the period,
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suggest that it is possible to earn both a positive and negative abnormal return
when pursuing an SRI strategy, which is not a conclusive result.
On a risk-adjusted basis, and with the original constraints of the unethical
portfolio, we are not able to find evidence of an abnormal return with statistical
significance from 2001-2016. Likewise, the Sharpe ratio showed the same results.
Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (H0,a)– that the unethical portfolio
does not outperform the market index, Vanguard Social Index US and Parnassus
Core Equity Fund regarding return and risk. Meaning that the unethical portfolio
did not yield any return over the required rate of return at a statistically significant
level during the past 16 years. Hence, the conclusion that our unethical investment
strategy had not been the superior strategy so far in the 21st-century and that a
rational investor should be indifferent between investing in our unethical portfolio
and a market index. Thus, there is no loss in neglecting the unethical stocks, and
the increasing SRI seems to be driven by, not only personal values, but by the
added social welfare to all stakeholders in addition to financial gains.
For Hypothesis II, we reject the null hypothesis that the unethical portfolio
yields the same abnormal return post-crisis as prior. The results suggest that
our unethical investment strategy outperforms the other comparables before the
global financial crisis, and underperforms after. The trend of SRI is positive and
closely following the market, while the trend for our unethical portfolio is the
reversed for the post-crisis period. Though it may not have overcome the hurdle of
statistical significance in the four-factor model, the aggregated results from 2010-
2016 indicate a downward trend for unethical stocks in this particular unethical
stock combination. Suggesting that the influx of SRI in recent years (Figure 1.1)
is financially motivated.
Contrary to our conclusion, previous literature has shown the superiority of
unethical stocks in the US. However, when changing the unethical definition and
excluding the oil/gas industry from the unethical portfolio, it outperforms all com-
parables by a substantial margin (Table B.2). Hence, the conclusion that the bad
performance of the unethical portfolio is solely due to the oil/gas industry. It also
shows that the market is not entirely efficient and that Fama’s Efficient Market
Hypothesis does not hold for the two strongest forms of efficiency.
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7.1 Further Research
As mentioned before, the definition of an unethical business is in a constant state
of fluctuation. What we consider unethical is very different, depending on location,
religion, period, etc. The next generations to come might not perceive the same
industries as unethical. Hence, the continuous changes in the definition, we find it
essential to keep updating this field of subject through time. Findings in this study
contradict the earlier study of Salaber (2007) in the European market showing that
an unethical portfolio performs better than comparable indexes during a recession.
Therefore, a thorough investigation on the behavior of unethical stocks including
oil/gas during recessions in the European market would be interesting to study.
Furthermore, an extended version of this research can be conducted in the
future beyond our time period and compared against more SRI indexes/Funds
to comprehensively research effectiveness of SRI. It would also be interesting to
include an existing unethical fund, for example, Vice Fund, to compare with an
actively managed unethical investment strategy.
AppendixA
A.1 Regression Against S&P 500 EWI
Table A.1. Regression Against S&P 500 EWI Entire Period
2001-2016 α βMKT βSMB βHML βmom R
2 Obs
Unethical Portfolio
CAPM 0,218 1,52*** 0,535 192
(0,581) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,014 1,001*** 0,580*** 0,333* 0,577 192
(0,970) (0,000) (0,002) (0,053)
Carhart 4 factor 0,002 1,031*** 0,576*** 0,329* 0,036 0,577 192
(0,996) (0,000) (0,003) (0,058) (0,735)
Vanguard Social Index
CAPM -0,170* 0,939*** 0,927 192
(0,081) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor -0,097 0,988*** -0,185*** -1,148** 0,941 192
(0,269) (0,000) (0,000) (0,023)
Carhart 4 factor -0,092 0,979*** -0,183*** -0,147** -0,014 0,941 192
(0,303) (0,000) (0,000) (0,021) (0,652)
Parnassus CE-Fund
CAPM 0,287*** 0,677*** 0,873 192
(0,005) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,336*** 0,710*** -0,131*** -0,092* 0,864 192
(0,001) (0,000) (0,010) (0,060)
Carhart 4 factor 0,313*** 0,752*** -0,139*** -0,098** 0,069*** 0,871 192
(0,002) (0,000) (0,007) (0,042) (0,002)
The results are calculated using a robust OLS-regression with monthly total return of the
portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (one month US Treasury bill) as the dependent
variable and the factors according to CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model and
Carhart four-factor model as the independent variable from 2001 to 2016. The total
return includes dividends reinvested. The values in parentheses are the p-value of the
coefficients. All coefficients in the regression is rounded to three decimal numbers. ***
1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance.
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Table A.2. Regression against S&P 500 EWI Before and After the Financial Crisis
2001-2006 α βMKT βSMB βHML βmom R
2 Obs
Unethical Portfolio
CAPM 0,612 0,922*** 0,535 72
(0,220) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,333 0,808*** 0,456* 0,116 0,554 72
(0,529) (0,000) (0,068) (0,568)
Carhart 4 factor 0,371 0,857*** 0,438* -0,014 0,113 0,561 72
(0,487) (0,000) (0,079) (0,955) (0,229)
Vanguard Social Index
CAPM -0,884** 0,789*** 0,645 72
(0,012) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor -0,122 0,839*** -0,352*** -0,730** 0,840 72
(0,636) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Carhart 4 factor -0,198 0,742*** -0,315*** -0,472** -0,226 0,887 72
(0,407) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,00)
Parnassus CE-Fund
CAPM -0,090 0,498*** 0,552 72
(0,722) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,337 0,526*** -0,196* -0,410*** 0,684 72
(0,254) (0,000) (0,076) (0,005)
Carhart 4 factor 0,288 0,463*** -0,172 -0,243 -0,146** 0,726 72
(0,338) (0,000) (0,145) (0,147) (0,022)
2010-2016
Unethical Portfolio
CAPM -1,096* 0,446*** 0,522 84
(0,062) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor -0,947* 0,366*** 0,654** 0,894*** 0,626 84
(0,077) (0,000) (0,021) (0,001)
Carhart 4 factor -0,733 0,340*** 0,735*** 0,701*** -0,430** 0,653 84
(0,181) (0,000) (0,008) (0,007) (0,024)
Vanguard Social Index
CAPM 0,0414 0,297*** 0,882 84
(0,773) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,032 0,301*** -0,053 0,008 0,883 84
(0,822) (0,000) (0,479) (0,934)
Carhart 4 factor -0,028 0,308*** -0,076 0,060 0,121** 0,891 84
(0,849) (0,000) (0,300) (0,529) (0,028)
Parnassus CE-Fund
CAPM 0,099 0,249*** 0,826 84
(0,530) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,075 0,259*** -0,137* 0,003 0,833 84
(0,631) (0,000) (0,078) (0,968)
Carhart 4 factor -0,016 0,270*** -0,172** 0,081 0,181*** 0,857 84
(0,920) (0,000) (0,030) (0,330) (0,000)
The results are calculated using a robust OLS-regression with monthly total return
of the portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (one month US Treasury bill) as the
dependent variable and the factors according to CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model
and Carhart four-factor model as the independent variable. The total return includes
dividends reinvested. The values in parentheses are the p-value of the coefficients. All
coefficients in the regression is rounded to three decimal numbers. *** 1%, ** 5% and *
10% significance.
AppendixB
B.1 Companies in Portfolio 2016
Table B.1. Top 10 Market Cap in the Portfolio 2016
Company Market Cap ($)
EXXON MOBIL CORP 361 757 540 352
CHEVRON CORP 213 865 381 888
ALTRIA GROUP INC 122 652 524 544
SCHLUMBERGER LTD 117 718 605 824
LOCKHEED MARTIN 78 049 165 312
REYNOLDS AMERICA 76 935 536 640
EOG RESOURCES 60 383 944 704
CONOCOPHILLIPS 59 745 902 592
OCCIDENTAL PETE 54 463 713 280
GENERAL DYNAMICS 53 717 250 048
LAS VEGAS SANDS 49 420 288 000
45
B.2 Monthly Stock Amount In Portfolio
Figure B.1. Monthly Rebalances Of The Unethical Portfolio
B.3 Oil Correlation
Figure B.2. Oilprice vs Unethical Portfolio
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B.4 Excluding Oil/Gas
Table B.2. Unethical Portfolio Excluded Oil/Gas Industry
2001-2016 α βMKT βSMB βHML βmom R
2 Obs
Unethical Portfolio
CAPM 0,714*** 1,042*** 0,586 192
(0,010) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,454** 0,897*** 0,700*** 0,354*** 0,694 192
(0,047) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Carhart 4 factor 0,492** 0,834*** 0,698*** 0,352*** -0,111 0,702 192
(0,033) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,217)
2001-2006
CAPM 1,546*** 0,814*** 0,454 72
(0,001) (0,000)
Fama-French 3 factor 0,729* 0,767*** 0,752*** 0,391*** 0,651 72
(0,078) (0,000) (0,000) (0,004)
Carhart 4 factor 0,757* 0,828*** 0,744*** 0,326** 0,086 0,656 72
(0,069) (0,000) (0,000) (0,040) (0,471)
2010-2016
CAPM 1,483*** -0,091 0,005 84
(0,009) (0,499)
Fama-French 3 factor 1,539*** -0,173 0,370 -0,090 0,0,030 84
(0,007) (0,257) (0,194) (0,744)
Carhart 4 factor 1,485*** -0,161 0,355 -0,027 0,139 0,037 84
(0,009) (0,307) (0,217) (0,924) (0,461)
The results are calculated using a robust OLS-regression with monthly total return of
the portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (one month US Treasury bill) as the depen-
dent variable and the factors according to CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model and
Carhart four-factor model as the independent variable. The total return includes div-
idends reinvested. The values in parentheses are the p-value of the coefficients. All
coefficients in the regression is rounded to three decimal numbers. *** 1%, ** 5% and *
10% significance.
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Figure B.3. Exclusion of oil/gas 2001-2016
Figure B.4. Exclusion of oil/gas 2001-2006
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Figure B.5. Exclusion of oil/gas 2010-2016
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